In the Court's December 21, 2017 Order re: In Camera Review for Violation of Patent 1 2 Prosecution Bar (Dkt. # 414), the Court requires that the parties appear on February 1, 2018¹ and 3 be prepared to "discuss the possible remedy if the Court were to conclude that there was a violation 4 of the patent prosecution bar for the pre-July 22, 2014 time period, post-July 22, 2014 time period, 5 or both." Amazon will, of course, be prepared to discuss these issues in general, but notes that 6 Judge Tigar's September 27, 2017 Order Re Alleged Prosecution Bar Violation (Dkt. # 403) sets 7 forth a schedule for discovery commencing after the resolution of the production and privilege 8 disputes currently before the Court, and only after that discovery is complete orders that "the par-9 ties will file a proposed briefing and hearing schedule (or if necessary, competing schedules) for 10 briefing remedies, including dismissal and/or judgment." (Id. at ¶10.) Accordingly, Amazon re-11 spectfully provides notice it objects to the extent that the Court intends to reach the merits of Am-12 azon's pending motion regarding Eolas's violation of the prosecution bar before Amazon has seen 13 unredacted versions of the documents produced in camera, taken the Court ordered discovery, and 14 submitted briefing on remedies.

As Amazon has previously pointed out, Amazon has never seen the documents Eolas produced *in camera*. And even after Eolas complies with the Court's order requiring production of many of the *in camera* documents, Amazon will likely still not have seen the most critical *in camera* documents. Further, because of the existence of the dispute over whether Eolas must produce unredacted copies of the *in camera* documents to Amazon, Amazon has not been able to take the discovery that Judge Tigar ordered. (*See*, Dkt. 403 at ¶¶ 4–11.) As a result, ruling on the merits of the underlying dispute *before* Amazon has seen the documents and *before* Amazon has taken the ordered discovery could seriously prejudice Amazon.

Amazon's objection to any potential premature ruling on the merits is further supported by Ninth Circuit law, which cautions against reliance on *in camera*, *ex parte* evidence in adjudicating the merits. As Judge Koh noted in remanding part of Magistrate Grewal's sanctions order in *Apple*,

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¹ Counsel for Amazon has a conflicting hearing on February 1 and has reached out to counsel for Eolas to request that the parties jointly propose that the Court reschedule the hearing for the preceding week—January 25.

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Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Case No. 11-cv-01840-LHK(PSG), 2014 WL 4684842, at */ (Sept.
19, 2014), the Ninth Circuit has long held that while courts may use in camera review to make
determinations concerning scope of privilege, courts should not rely on materials produced only
in camera in reaching the merits of a dispute. "While approving in camera review for resolving
disputes over access to documents, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned against using such procedures
to resolve issues on the merits." Id. (emphasis in original). Judge Koh went on to quote the Ninth
Circuit in Meridian Int'l Logistics, Inc. v. United States, as follows: "'[T]his court has generally
recognized the capacity of a district judge to fashion and guide the procedures to be followed in
cases before him,' [but] 'in our judicial system adversary proceedings are the norm and ex parte
proceedings the exception." Id. (quoting, Meridian Int'l Logistics, Inc. v. United States 939 F.2d
740, 745 (9th Cir. 1991)). The rule eschewing reliance on ex parte evidence, like an in camera
review, to reach the merits of a dispute is widely followed. ²

Therefore, Amazon respectfully provides notice that it objects to the extent that the Court intends to reach the merits of the underlying dispute before Amazon has been given an opportunity to review critical documents, take necessary discovery, and submit briefing on remedies.

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² See, e.g., Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1346 (9th Cir 1981) ("The receipt and review by the district court of the tenure review file for the purpose of assisting it to make factual determinations or to evaluate other evidence violated principles of due process upon which our judicial system depends to resolve disputes fairly and accurately."); Vining v. Runyon, 99 F.3d 1056, 1057 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Although a judge freely may use in camera, ex parte examination of evidence to prevent the discovery or use of evidence, consideration of in camera submissions to determine the merits of litigation is allowable only when the submissions involve compelling national security concerns or the statute granting the cause of action specifically provides for in camera resolution of the dispute."); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060–61 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("We note our grave concern about the district court's heavy reliance upon in camera ex parte evidence when it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment ... It is a hallmark of our adversary system that we safeguard party access to the evidence tendered in support of a requested court judgment ... Exceptions to the main rule are both few and tightly contained. Most notably, inspection of materials by a judge isolated in chambers may occur when a party seeks to prevent use of the materials in the litigation ... If the court finds that the claimed privilege does not apply, then the other side must be given access to the information; if the court's finding is that the privilege does apply, then the court may not rely upon the information in reaching its judgment."); Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 06-cv-00545-WHA, 2012 WL 6652362, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012) ("[T]he judge may receive ex parte secret communications for deciding ancillary matters, such as discovery privilege, but only in the rarest of circumstances should the judge do so to resolve or to end a case.").

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